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Material	Cultures	of	Water	Financialisation	in	England	and	Wales	
Kate	Bayliss,	SOAS,	University	of	London	
Abstract	The	 ownership	 structure	 of	 the	 water	 and	 sewerage	 sector	 has	 changed	substantially	 in	England	and	Wales	since	 the	 ten	companies	were	 listed	on	 the	London	Stock	Exchange	 in	1989.	The	majority	of	 firms	are	now	de-listed	and	a	number	of	companies	are	now	owned	by	financial	investors	via	special	purpose	vehicles.	In	some	cases,	revenue	streams	from	customer	water	bills	have	become	securitised	for	decades	into	the	future	to	raise	funds	for	investment	but	also	to	finance	 distributions	 to	 shareholders.	 The	 high	 financing	 costs	 associated	with	these	 highly-leveraged	 corporate	 structures	 are	 passed	 on	 to	 customers.	 The	regulator,	 Ofwat,	 tasked	 with	 protecting	 the	 interests	 of	 consumers,	 operates	largely	within	a	system	of	price	controls	intended	to	mimic	a	competitive	market	in	 the	absence	of	 financial	 speculation.	This	means	 that	 regulation	steers	away	from	 intervening	 in	 the	 financialised	 corporate	 structures	 that	 have	 emerged	around	some	of	 the	water	utilities.	These	manifestations	of	 financialisation	are	considered	 to	 be	 ‘market	 outcomes’.	 This	 paper	 explores	 the	 discourses	 and	narratives	that	have	developed	in	the	provision	of	water	in	England	and	Wales	to	create	a	situation	where	such	rentier	transfers	are	normalised.	Using	the	systems	of	provision	approach,	the	paper	shows	that	the	material	culture	of	water	finance	has	been	constructed	along	narrow	lines	with	superficial	consumer	consultation	while	extensive	financial	engineering	to	increase	shareholder	returns	continues	unimpeded.				
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Introduction			This	 paper	 considers	 the	material	 culture	 of	 financialisation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	provision	of	water	in	England	and	Wales,	EW.	Since	the	industry	was	privatised,	ownership	stakes	have	changed	hands	and	some	water	companies	became	owned	by	private	equity	investors.	The	sector	has	evolved	considerably	in	the	decades	since	privatisation.	Some	companies	have	become	highly	indebted	and	financial	engineering	has	led	to	substantial	returns	generated	from	speculative	activities,	far	 removed	 from	 the	 production	 and	 distribution	 of	 water.	 Yet	 this	 is	unchallenged	and	even	normalised	through	the	narrative	of	efficiency,	investment	and	 market	 outcomes.	 This	 paper	 considers	 the	 structures	 and	 cultures	 that	underpin	this	normalisation.	It	draws	heavily	on	a	case	study	conducted	for	the	European	Union-funded	FESSUD	research	programme	(see	Bayliss	2014	for	more	details).	Households	mostly	know	little	about	the	heavily	financialised	structure	that	lies	behind	their	water	consumption.	For	the	vast	majority	of	water	consumers	in	EW,	little	appears	to	have	changed	in	the	way	they	consume	water	since	privatisation,	by	the	turn	of	a	tap.	While	some	may	now	have	their	consumption	metered,	many	private	 water	 companies	 still	 have	 the	 same	 name	 as	 their	 public	 sector	predecessors.	 This	 superficial	 continuity	 conceals	 substantial	 changes	 in	 the	underlying	 social	 and	economic	 relations	of	 the	 sector.	 Largely,	 consumers	 are	unaware	that	they	are	making	significant	payments	to	global	financialised	capital	via	their	water	bills.	This	paper	draws	on	the	Systems	of	Provision	(SoP)	approach	to	explore	the	way	in	which	relations	between	agents	in	the	production	and	consumption	of	water	
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interact	to	promote	specific	outcomes	(for	more	on	the	SoP	approach	see	Bayliss,	Fine	and	Robertson	2013).	The	actors	at	different	stages	along	the	SoP	engage	in	and	 experience	 financialisation1	differently	 depending	 on	 their	 position	 in	 the	chain	 of	 provision	 and	 even	 their	 physical	 location	 in	 the	 country	 as	 there	 is	considerable	 regional	 diversity	 in	 forms	 of	 water	 delivery.	 After	 a	 brief	background	review	of	some	of	the	wider	literature	regarding	water	reforms	in	EW,	the	 paper	 aims	 to	 highlight	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 financialisation	 has	 become	embedded	in	the	provision	of	water	in	EW,	outlining	the	financial	methods	used	to	increase	surplus	extraction.	Then,	the	paper	explores	the	attitudes	and	cultures	that	 are	 attached	 to	 this	 structure.	 This	 requires	 differentiating	 between	 the	agents	 along	 the	 SoP.	 Private	 investors,	 the	 regulator	 and	 consumers	 all	 have	evolved	 their	 own	 understandings	 and	 cultures	 so	 that	 financialisation	 is	legitimised.		The	paper	shows	that	after	more	that	25	years	of	privatisation,	the	provision	of	water	has	fully	entered	circuits	of	global	capital.	Household	water	bills	for	decades	into	the	future	have,	in	some	cases,	become	assets	of	private	equity	investors	and	have	been	repackaged	and	sold	on	via	off-shore	jurisdictions.	Yet	there	has	been	scarcely	a	murmur	of	protest	from	any	quarter.	This	is	in	sharp	contrast	with	other	parts	of	the	world	where	much	weaker	forms	of	privatisation	(with	a	fixed-term	concession	contract	rather	than	divestiture)	have	resulted	in	major	protests.	 In	conclusion,	the	paper	considers	how	an	understanding	of	the	material	culture	of	finance	for	water	sheds	light	on	this	(lack	of)	response.		
Background		The	privatisation	of	water	has	been	bluntly	described	as	part	of	a	general	process	of	‘accumulation	by	dispossession’,	a	new	round	of	enclosures	of	the	commons	and	
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expansion	of	primitive	accumulation	(Harvey	2005;	Bakker	2005;	Ahlers	2010;	Roberts	 2008).	 However,	 privatisation	 in	 practice	 occurs	 differently	 across	locations.	Water	 in	 EW	was	 privatised	 in	 1989	 by	 floating	 regional	water	 and	sewerage	 companies	 on	 the	 London	 Stock	 Exchange,	 LSE.	 Prior	 to	 this,	 water	sector	reforms	in	EW	in	the	1970s	and	’80s	followed	a	pattern	of	neoliberalisation	(see	Fine	et	al.	(2015)	for	more	on	neoliberalism)	similar	to	that	adopted	across	the	 world	 with	 water	 companies	 established	 at	 ‘arm’s	 length’	 from	 the	government	and	price	setting	based	on	cost	recovery	principles	(Bayliss	2013).	However,	 the	 way	 in	 which	 privatisation	 was	 implemented	 in	 EW,	 with	 the	complete	 divestiture	 of	 state	 companies,	 has	 not	 been	 adopted	 in	 any	 other	country.	In	neighbouring	Northern	Ireland	and	Scotland,	water	has	remained	in	public	hands.	Where	privatisation	was	implemented	elsewhere	this	has	typically	followed	 the	 French	 “affermage”	model	with	 the	 introduction	 of	 concession	 or	lease	contracts	for	the	operation	of	the	water	infrastructure.	Sometimes	these	are	for	long	time	periods	but,	ultimately,	ownership	of	the	infrastructure	remains	with	the	state.	In	EW,	privatisation	by	divestiture	was	intended	to	be	irreversible	and	to	 create	 a	 class	 of	 share	 owning	 investors.	 Water	 was	 one	 of	 a	 number	 of	industries	privatised	in	this	way	in	the	UK	in	the	1980s	(Parker	2004).	This	mode	of	privatisation	has	been	fundamental	to	the	financialisation	that	has	followed.	Water	 privatisation	 was	 associated	 with	 a	 change	 in	 the	 ethos	 of	 water	management	in	common	with	the	expansion	of	neoliberalism	more	widely.	Bakker	(2005)	charts	the	transition	in	the	provision	of	water	in	EW	from	a	post-war,	‘state	hydraulic’	model,	where	policy	emphasis	was	on	the	supply-led	development	of	water	 infrastructure	 with	 largely	 state	 ownership	 of	 resources,	 to	 ‘market	environmentalism’	 where	 economic	 efficiency	 is	 prized	 over	 access	 or	 equity.	
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Swyngedouw	 (2005,	 p.98)	 describes	water	 privatisation	 as	 ‘a	 process	 through	which	 nature’s	 goods	 become	 integrated	 into	 global	 circuits	 of	 capital’	 and	privatisation	 is	 increasingly	 linked	with	 financialisation.	 For	 example,	 Leyshon	and	Thrift	(2007)	refer	specifically	to	the	need	for	finance	to	ultimately	drill	down	to	real	sector	activity.	They	argue	(p.98)	that	the	‘bedrock’	of	financial	capitalism	is	 ‘dependent	 on	 the	 constant	 searching	 out	 or	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 asset	streams’.	Such	a	predictable	stream	can	be	securitised	and	this	allows	borrowers	to	 effectively	 realise	 their	 income	 streams	 ‘early.	 They	 use	 the	 example	 of	 UK	Private	Finance	Initiatives	but,	as	this	paper	shows,	it	equally	applies	to	the	water	sector.	 Allen	 and	 Pryke	 (2013)	 take	 up	 the	 theme	 of	 securitisation	 in	 their	research	into	Thames	Water.	They	describe	a	process	of	financialisation	of	water	where	 ‘households	 themselves	 are	 the	 financial	 asset’	 (p.	 419).	 Such	‘commoditisation’	of	both	people	and	nature	under	capitalism	increasingly	shape	social	relationships	(LeBaron	2010).2	Ekers	and	Loftus	(2008)	consider	the	politics	of	urban	water	provision	through	the	 lens	 of	 Gramsci	 and	 Foucault	 to	 show	 how	 (706),	 from	 a	 Gramscian	perspective	 water	 infrastructure	 can	 be	 considered	 part	 of	 the	 hegemonic	apparatus	through	which	forms	of	‘common	sense’	in	support	of	a	specific	group’s	interests	come	to	be	constituted.	Meanwhile,	from	a	Foucauldian	approach,	‘this	entails	 managing	 the	 conduct	 of	 people	 and	 their	 relations	 with	 the	 material	world,	customs,	beliefs	and	ways	of	acting	and	thinking’.	They	posit	that	everyday	relations	 with	 water	 contribute	 to	 the	 maintenance	 of	 hegemony	 and	 the	continuance	of	subtle	forms	of	rule.	Thus,	water	financialisation	can	be	considered	to	be	part	of	a	wider	project	of	social	control.		
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More	specifically,	Allen	and	Pryke	assess	the	model	of	‘household	securitisation’	where	household	water	 bills	 become	 a	 financial	 asset	 of	 the	 company	 through	policies	such	as	those	adopted	by	Thames	Water.	In	attempting	to	understand	why	this	is	tolerated,	they	conclude	that	this	model	of	financialised	household	water	‘appears	 to	be	 the	subject	of	a	political	 “ring-fence”	where	 the	regulatory	body	brokers	 agreement	with	 investors	 over	 domestic	water	 prices,	 service	 quality,	water	efficiency	and	the	 like,	yet	 leave	untouched	the	politics	of	packaging	and	selling	households	as	a	captive	revenue	stream’	(p.420).	They	stop	short,	however,	of	trying	to	understand	why	the	securitisation	of	water	seems	to	be	off	limits	for	the	regulator.	This	paper	attempts	to	expand	on	some	of	these	themes	using	the	lens	of	the	material	culture	of	financialisation,	and	the	10Cs	(see	Introduction	and	Fine,	 this	 volume)	 to	 investigate	 the	 processes	which	 have	 shaped	 the	 current	system	of	provision	and	the	cultures	that	sustain	it.	
Financialisation	in	practice		Concern	is	restricted,	though,	to	the	ten	regional	companies	that	provide	water	and	sewerage	services	across	England	and	Wales.3	Since	the	initial	privatisation	in	1989,	the	ownership	structure	has	shifted	considerably.	Only	three	companies	remain	 listed	 on	 the	 LSE.	 Owners	 of	 these	 listed	 companies	 are	 mostly	institutional	investors.	For	example,	more	than	95%	of	Severn	Trent	shares	are	owned	 by	 financial	 institutions	 including	 insurance	 companies,	 nominee	companies,	 banks,	 pension	 funds	 other	 corporate	 bodies,	 limited	 and	 public	companies.4	Some	of	the	 largest	 investors	have	a	stake	 in	more	than	one	utility	(such	as	investment	fund	manager	Blackrock	Inc	which	has	a	stake	in	Severn	Trent	and	United	Utilities).		
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Of	the	other	seven	water	companies,	one	(Welsh	Water)	is	owned	by	a	not-for-profit	 company,	 two	 (Wessex	Water	 and	 Northumbrian	Water)	 are	 owned	 by	large	Asian	conglomerates,	and	four	are	owned	by	SPVs	put	together	by	financial	investors	and,	 in	most	 cases,	 listed	off-shore.	Details	of	 the	ownership	of	 these	companies	are	provided	below:		
• Yorkshire	Water’s	ultimate	parent	company	is	Kelda	Holdings	Ltd	registered	in	Jersey	and	owned	by	Deutsche	Asset	&	Wealth	Management,	Corsair	Capital	(described	 on	 the	 Kelda	 website	 as	 “a	 capital	 custodian	 for	 investors	 in	infrastructure	companies”),	GIC	Special	Investments,	the	private	equity	arm	of	the	Government	of	Singapore	Investment	Corporation	and	M&G	Infracapital	Investments	(part	of	Prudential	Plc);5		
• Anglian	Water’s	parent	company	is	Anglian	Water	Group	Ltd,	registered	in	Jersey	and	owned	by	Colonial	First	State	Global	Asset	Management	 (part	of	Commonwealth	 Bank	 of	 Australia),	 the	 Canadian	 Pension	 Plan	 Investment	Board,	 Industry	 Funds	Management	 (a	 global	 asset	 manager	 owned	 by	 30	Australian	 pension	 funds	 specialising	 in	 infrastructure,	 private	 equity,	 debt	investment	 and	 listed	 equity)	 and	3i	 (an	 international	 investor	 focusing	 on	private	equity,	infrastructure	and	debt	management);6		
• Thames	Water’s	ultimate	parent	is	Kemble	Water	Holdings	Ltd	owned	by	a	consortium	 led	 by	 Macquarie	 European	 Infrastructure	 Fund	 II	 LP	 (MEIF2)	owned	 by	 Australian	 Macquarie	 Group,	 with	 other	 stakeholders	 including	Australian	and	Dutch	pension	funds,	the	Abu	Dhabi	Investment	Authority,	CIC	the	Chinese	sovereign	wealth	fund,	and	the	BT	Pension	Scheme;7		
• Southern	Water	was	bought	 from	the	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	 in	2007	by	a	consortium	 known	 as	 Greensands	 Holdings	 Ltd	 registered	 in	 Jersey	 with	
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owners	including	IIF	International	SW	UK	Investments	Limited	(advised	by	JP	Morgan	 Investments	 Inc.),	 the	 Northern	 Trust	 Company	 (Australian	 asset	management	 firm),	 Phildrew	 Nominees	 (a	 subsidiary	 of	 UBS	 Global	 Asset	Management),	 Sumaya	 Investments	 Ltd	 and	 various	 others	 including	 a	Superannuation	Fund	from	Papua	New	Guinea.8	Since	 privatisation,	 the	 sector	 has	 seen	 a	 marked	 increase	 in	 indebtedness	 of	water	companies.	The	level	of	gearing	(the	ratio	of	debt	to	equity)	has	increased	substantially,	although	this	has	been	more	pronounced	in	some	companies	than	others.	The	different	company	ownership	structures	have	been	associated	with	equally	diverse	financial	practices.	Typically	the	de-listing	of	a	company	from	the	LSE	is	associated	with	a	reduction	in	public	scrutiny	of	the	operations	of	the	firm,	as	 the	 value	 of	 the	 share	 price	 gives	 an	 indication	 of	 how	 the	 market	 values	different	 companies.	 But	 the	 de-listed	 companies	 owned	 by	 infrastructure	conglomerates	 (Wessex	 and	 Northumbrian	 Water)	 appear	 to	 have	 more	 in	common,	in	terms	of	corporate	structures,	with	the	companies	that	remain	listed	on	the	LSE	than	with	the	de-listed	companies	owned	by	financial	investors.		A	 detailed	 review	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 corporate	 groups,	 within	 which	 the	regulated	 water	 utility	 is	 situated,	 indicates	 that	 the	 companies	 owned	 by	infrastructure	conglomerates	and	 those	 listed	on	 the	LSE	are	associated	with	a	‘flatter’	group	structure	with	just	one	or	two	intermediaries	between	the	regulated	company	and	the	ultimate	registered	parent.	The	finance-owned	companies,	by	contrast,	have	a	long	ladder	of	companies	between	the	regulated	water	provider	and	the	ultimate	parent	company.	Most	of	these	rungs	in	the	ladder	do	little	apart	from	receive	and	pay	out	interest	and	dividends	to	other	companies	in	the	group.	Figure	1	shows	an	abbreviated	diagram	of	the	flow	of	such	funds	associated	with	
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Thames	Water.	Dividends	and	interest	paid	by	the	regulated	utility	on	intergroup	loans	flow	up	the	corporate	chain	before	reaching	the	ultimate	shareholders.	The	reality	 is	 more	 complicated	 than	 shown	 here.	 Research	 published	 in	 2014	revealed	nine	companies	between	the	regulated	utility	and	the	ultimate	parent,	Kemble	Water	Holdings	Ltd	as	opposed	to	the	four	in	this	diagram	(Bayliss	2014).		INSERT	FIGURE	1	ABOUT	HERE	A	similar	pattern	can	be	observed	in	the	corporate	group	structures	of	the	other	financially	owned	companies	(Anglian,	Yorkshire	and	Southern	Water).	Another	common	feature	of	these	four	companies	is	that	they	have	all	carried	out	a	process	known	 as	 Whole	 Business	 Securitisation	 (WBS).	 This	 is	 a	 complex	 financial	operation	whereby	finance	is	raised	on	the	basis	of	future	cash	flows,	the	revenue	stream	from	the	payment	of	water	bills	 in	 this	case.	These	are	packaged	 into	a	tradable	financial	asset	and	sold	to	investors.	WBS	requires	certain	covenants	to	be	put	in	place	to	protect	investors	such	as	ring-fencing	of	the	business	segment	that	relates	to	the	revenue	stream.	With	these	established,	the	creditworthiness	of	 the	 firm	is	enhanced	and	they	are	able	 to	 increase	their	gearing	 levels	while	maintaining	their	credit	rating.	WBS	is	only	possible	where	there	is	an	extremely	stable	revenue	stream	for	which	the	EW	water	companies	are	ideal.		Ironically,	WBS	was	first	used	in	the	water	sector	to	enable	the	not-for-profit	Glas	Cymru	to	take	over	Welsh	Water,	using	debt	to	finance	the	acquisition	in	2001.	An	additional	part	of	this	transaction	required	that	a	subsidiary	group	company	be	set	up	in	the	Cayman	Islands	in	order	to	overcome	the	restrictions	of	UK	corporate	law	regarding	the	raising	of	debt	to	facilitate	an	acquisition.	This	model	was	then	followed	by	Anglian,	Thames,	Southern	and	Yorkshire	Water.	Using	WBS	and	with	a	 Cayman	 Island	 group	 company,	 these	 investors	 were	 able	 to	 buy	 water	
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companies	in	large	part	using	debt	finance	which	was	then	added	to	the	debts	of	the	company	(rather	than	staying	with	the	investors).	Since	then,	Welsh	Water	has	paid	 off	 a	 considerable	 portion	 of	 its	 debt.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 finance-owned	companies	are	now	the	ones	with	the	highest	gearing	levels	and	the	lowest	credit	ratings	of	the	sector,	although	they	are	still	a	couple	of	notches	above	investment	grade	(Table	1),	so	they	stay	within	the	bounds	of	regulatory	requirements	on	this	criterion.	INSERT	TABLE	1	HERE	The	 consolidation	 of	 acquisition	 debt	 is	 one	 reason	 for	 the	 increase	 in	 water	company	debts.	Another	reason	is	that	these	firms	have	also	raised	loans	in	order	to	pay	dividends.	Bayliss	(2014)	provides	a	detailed	account	of	the	transactions	for	 Anglian,	 Yorkshire,	 Thames	 and	 Southern	Water	 which	 have	 all	 increased	gearing	and	delivered	associated	special	dividends	as	a	pay-out	to	shareholders,	this	often	coinciding	with	the	initial	takeover.	It	is	a	theme	that	has	been	raised	in	several	accounts	of	the	sector	although	often	only	in	passing	(such	as	PWC	(2013:	15);	RiskMetrics	(2008:	7);	Allen	and	Pryke	(2013:	426)	and	Turner	(2013)).	Finally,	another	reason	to	 increase	debt	 is	 that	 interest	 is	 tax	deductible	(while	dividends	 are	not)	 so	 companies	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 finance	 investment	with	borrowing	rather	than	equity.	These	companies	pay	little	tax	due	in	part	to	their	high	 interest	 payments,	 and	 the	 amount	 they	 pay	 in	 interest	 has	 soared	 since	privatisation.	 This	 incentive	 is	 enhanced	 further	 where	 the	 loans	 are	 from	shareholders	 at	 high	 rates	 of	 interest.	 The	 2013	 (81)	 accounts	 of	 the	 ultimate	parent	 of	 Southern	Water,	 Greensands	 Holdings	 Ltd,	 show	 interest	 of	 £67.9m	payable	to	the	shareholders	on	loans	of	£633.9m.	The	2013	accounts	of	Thames	Water	 Utility	 Ltd	 (the	 regulated	 company)	 show	 that	 interest	 was	 paid	 to	
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shareholders	of	£17.5m	(TWUL	Annual	Report	2013:	75).	In	part,	then	the	debts	incurred	 are	 a	means	 to	provide	 further	distributions	 to	 shareholders	 through	(tax-deductible)	interest	payments.	The	above	demonstrates	then	that	there	is	a	heavily	financialised	structure	to	the	production	in	some	areas	of	water	provision	but	that	this	varies	across	investor	types.	For	consumers,	though,	the	experience	of	financialisation	is	largely	unseen.	Few	of	 the	 fifteen	million	Thames	Water	customers,	 for	example,	will	have	any	idea	 that	paying	 their	water	bill	 connects	 them	to	one	of	 the	 largest	Australian	investment	 banks	 via	 a	 portfolio	 of	 European	 infrastructure	 funds.	 They	 are,	however,	beholden	to	these	investors.	Average	household	bills	have	increased	by	40	per	cent	in	real	terms	since	privatisation	(NAO	2013).	Over	the	2010-15	price	review	period,	nearly	27	per	cent	of	the	average	customer	bill	of	£360	was	paid	for	 ‘return	 on	 capital’	 (Ofwat	 2011a:	 8;	 Ofwat	 2011b:	 9).	 This	 is	 just	 to	 cover	financing	costs	of	interest	and	dividends	and	not	actual	investment.	The	water	SoP	generates	a	substantial	transfer	of	revenue	from	households.		
Material	cultures	of	water	financialisation		The	privatisation	and	financialisation	of	water	creates	a	shift	 in	the	relations	of	economic	and	social	reproduction.	The	transitions	are	experienced	differently	by	the	 agents	 in	 the	 SoP.	 This	 section	 explores	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 ethos	 of	financialisation	is	incorporated	into	the	cultures	of	the	stakeholders	in	the	SoP.	In	so	doing	the	paper	makes	selective	use	of	the	10Cs	set	out	in	the	Introduction	to	this	volume	in	framing	the	material	culture	of	water	financialisation.		The	discussion	shows	that	the	agents	in	the	SoP	have	Contested	priorities	in	the	operation	of	the	water	sector.	For	investors,	the	provision	of	water	is	seen	in	terms	of	a	source	of	profit.	For	consumers,	water	is	an	essential	service	and	an	item	of	
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household	expenditure.	While	 the	 consumer	has	 an	 interest	 in	 an	efficient	 and	effective	water	 supply,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 pricing,	 the	 interests	 of	 these	 agents	diverge.	The	regulator	is	supposedly	tasked	with	mediating	between	these	agents	but	the	interests	of	investors	would	appear	to	be	prioritised.	This	is	justified	on	the	grounds	that	what	is	good	for	investors	is	good	for	consumers.	For	example,	according	 to	 Ofwat	 (2008:	 1):	 ‘A	 regulatory	 system	 that	 gives	 incentives	 to	companies	to	be	efficient,	and	to	make	profits,	is	in	the	best	long-term	interests	of	customers’.	Thus	 the	 regulatory	discourse	 is	Construed	 so	 that	 the	 interests	of	consumers	are	merged	with	those	of	investors	and	the	conflicts	between	agents	overlooked.		
Water	companies	
	Water	 in	 EW	 is	 an	 attractive	 investment	 with	 an	 almost	 guaranteed	 revenue	stream	and	a	sympathetic	regulator.	In	part	this	stems	from	the	material	culture	of	water	which	 is	vital	 for	 life	and	 is	an	 important	 input	 into	other	production	processes.	 It	often	has	no	substitutes,	provision	 is	 capital-intensive	and	 largely	monopolistic	due	to	the	high	sunk	investment	costs.	Furthermore,	it	is	not	a	sector	of	rapid	technological	progress.	Once	a	water	system	is	established	it	can	generate	regular	long-term	financial	inflows	over	a	period	of	decades.		However,	 in	 many	 countries,	 water	 privatisation	 has	 not	 been	 widespread.	Opposition	to	water	privatisation	usually	stems	from	the	strategic	nature	of	water	and	its	importance	for	social	reproduction.	In	developing	countries,	privatisation	efforts	have	been	disappointing	with	firms	reluctant	to	invest,	in	part	because	of	fears	of	the	contract	being	cancelled	due	to	political	pressure.	There	are	no	such	concerns	 in	 EW.	 The	 culture	 of	 water	 privatisation	 is	 long-established	 and	 is	replicated	across	other	sectors	such	as	energy	and	transport.	The	UK	is	planning	
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to	attract	more	infrastructural	investment	from	the	private	sector	in	the	coming	decades	 so	 it	 is	 important	 that	 this	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 attractive	 destination	 for	investment	finance.	This	strengthens	the	position	of	water	company	investors	as	many	 also	 have	 stakes	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 infrastructure	 whether	 in	 the	 UK	 or	globally.	 This	 unique	 Context	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 fertile	 breeding	 ground	 for	financialisation.		For	 private	 equity	 investors,	 water	 companies	 offer	 particularly	 profitable	opportunities.	 Such	 buyers	 have	 a	 reputation	 for	 buying	 up	 firms	 and	 turning	them	around	to	make	a	quick	profit	using	debt	rather	than	equity	investment	as	far	as	possible	(for	example,	Cooper	2015).	The	 ‘sweating’	of	assets	and	raising	debts	 to	 pay	 a	 special	 dividend	 to	 shareholders	 is	 common	 practice	 for	 such	investors,	and	the	same	goes	for	adding	acquisition	debt	to	the	company	(Shaxson	2013). 9 	This	 was	 the	 approach	 adopted	 in	 the	 water	 sector	 and	 has	 led	 to	considerable	returns	for	investors.	The	financial	gains	are	not	always	obvious.	As	mentioned	above,	shareholders	received	substantial	‘special	dividends’	during	the	acquisition	process	but	distributions	are	also	realised	through	shareholder	loans	to	 the	 companies	 and	 with	 profits	 made	 on	 the	 sale	 of	 ownership	 stakes.	Macquarie,	for	example,	has	sold	off	small	parts	of	its	stake	in	Thames	Water	for	‘undisclosed	sums’.	These	shareholder	returns	are	not	easily	traced	in	standard	financial	reports.	The	high	profits	that	can	be	earned	from	water	investments	are	revealed	in	the	high	price	that	investors	are	willing	to	pay	to	acquire	stakes	in	the	companies,	 over	and	above	 the	 regulated	asset	value	 (RAV).	 Southern,	Thames	and	Anglian	Water	were	 sold	 in	 the	2000s	 for	20-25	per	 cent	over	RAV,	while	Yorkshire	Water	 fetched	a	34	per	 cent	premium	 (Utility	Week	2009).	 In	2013,	Severn	Trent	rejected	a	bid	estimated	to	be	a	27.8	per	cent	premium	on	the	RAV	
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(Bloomberg	Business	News	2013).	 For	 shareholders	 of	 listed	water	 companies	such	a	takeover	offers	considerable	financial	rewards.	Listed	water	utility,	United	Utilities,	saw	its	share	price	‘leap’	in	September	2015	when	a	broker	indicated	that	it	 was	 an	 attractive	 acquisition	 target	 for	 a	 pension	 or	 infrastructure	 fund	(Telegraph	 2015).	 For	 these	 firms,	 then,	 EW	 water	 companies	 are	 profitable	investments	and	regulation	presents	obstacles	 that	at	most	need	 to	be	worked	around.	 As	 Hildyard	 (2012)	 points	 out,	 for	 investors,	 the	 term	 infrastructure	means	a	revenue	stream	rather	than	bricks	and	mortar.		
The	regulator:	Ofwat	
	The	Water	Services	Regulation	Authority,	Ofwat,	was	established	at	 the	time	of	privatisation.	 The	 primary	 tasks	 of	 Ofwat	 are	 designated	 to	 be	 to	 protect	 the	interests	of	consumers,	to	make	sure	that	water	and	sewerage	companies	carry	out	 their	 functions	 observing	 the	 terms	 of	 their	 licence	 and	 to	 secure	 that	 the	companies	are	able	to	finance	their	operations	(known	as	‘financeability’).10	The	main	regulatory	tool	is	price-cap	regulation,	devised	in	the	1980s	and	originally	applied	 to	 the	 privatised	 telecoms	 and	 electricity	 industries.	 Prices	 are	 set	 in	advance	for	a	five-year	period.	Currently	the	2015-2020	regulatory	period	has	just	started	with	prices	that	were	set	in	the	2014	price	review	process	(PR14).	Prices	for	2010	to	2015	were	set	in	the	2009	Price	Review	process	(PR09).	The	maximum	price	that	each	company	can	charge	is	multiplied	each	year	by	a	factor,	known	as	K,	as	well	as	the	increase	in	the	RPI	(water	prices	are	inflation-proof).		Price	cap	regulation	is	supposed	to	encourage	and	harness	efficiency	in	a	way	that	other	regulatory	methods,	such	as	rate-of-return	regulation,	do	not.	The	 idea	 is	that	where	the	price	is	fixed	for	a	five-year	period,	companies	have	an	incentive	to	increase	productivity	as	they	can	retain	the	additional	profits	generated.	At	the	
This	is	the	version	of	the	article	accepted	for	publication	in	New	Political	Economy	published	by	Taylor	&	Francis	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13563467.2017.1259300		
	 15	
end	of	the	five	years	the	regulator	incorporates	productivity	improvements	into	the	 next	 price	 setting	 process	 so	 the	 gains	 are	 subsequently	 shared	 with	customers.	Rate-of-return	regulation	in	contrast	is	considered	to	stifle	innovation	and	productivity	gains	and	instead	incentivises	firms	to	increase	their	costs	with	profits	following	in	proportion.		The	framing	of	the	regulatory	framework	is	in	terms	of	intervening	to	weaken	the	scope	for	monopolistic	exploitative	practices.	For	example,	Ofwat	is	required	to	promote	 effective	 competition	 wherever	 appropriate	 to	 protect	 consumer	interests.	The	regulatory	tools	are	intended	to	act	as	market	forces	might	ideally	perceived	to	do.	By	fixing	prices	in	advance,	water	companies	are	supposed	to	be	forced	to	act	as	price	takers	as	they	would	be	in	an	imaginary	competitive	market.	Similarly,	 price	 controls	 are	 affected	 by	 firm	 performance	 against	 targets	 for	meeting	 customer	 service	 standards.	 Where	 these	 are	 not	 met,	 firms	 see	 a	reduction	in	the	price	they	are	allowed	to	charge.	This	is	supposed	to	reflect	the	loss	 in	 revenue	 that	would	 occur	 if	 customers	were	 able	 to	 use	 an	 alternative	source	of	supply.	However,	 this	 regulatory	 framework	 in	 practice	 involves	 mediating	 between	agents	with	competing	 interests	and	contradictory	objectives.	Any	solution	has	winners	and	losers	and	regulation	is	not	neutral.	The	competing	interests	in	the	sector	come	out	in	the	contestation	over	the	value	of	K,	the	factor	by	which	prices	can	be	adjusted.	A	small	change	in	the	value	of	K	can	have	a	significant	effect	on	water	prices	and	a	large	impact	on	company	revenue.	The	calculation	of	K	is	highly	complex	and	involves	assumptions	about	future	financing	needs	and	costs	as	well	as	past	performance	against	targets.	The	2009	price	review	(where	prices	were	
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concerns	that	financing	costs	would	rise	significantly.	This	fed	into	the	setting	of	K.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 interest	 rates	 have	 remained	 extremely	 low	 and	 firms	have	benefitted	from	prices	based	on	an	assumed	cost	of	capital	that	was	higher	than	actual.	In	fact,	the	past	three	price	reviews	(covering	a	15-year	period)	have	been	generous	to	water	companies.	The	cost	of	debt	has	consistently	been	below	that	assumed	 in	 the	price	reviews	by	Ofwat	 (Ofwat	2013a),	although	 the	 latest	review	(PR14),	which	set	the	prices	from	2015	to	2020	looks	set	to	lower	prices	slightly.	The	role	of	Ofwat	is	presented	as	an	external	enforcer	of	rules	but	in	practice	the	regulatory	 structure	 itself	 affects	 the	 ability	 of	 firms	 to	 meet	 the	 regulatory	requirements	 so	 the	 relationship	 is	 not	 so	 simple.	 For	 example,	 Ofwat	 has	 a	responsibility	to	ensure	financeability,	which	means	that	prices	need	to	be	set	at	a	level	at	which	firms	can	still	raise	sufficient	funds	to	finance	investment.	Firms	also	have	a	requirement	to	maintain	a	credit	rating	that	is	‘investment	grade’	as	determined	by	external	credit	ratings	agencies	(Standard	and	Poors,	Moody’s	and	Fitch).	 But	 if	 firms	 increase	 their	 debts,	 this	 puts	 downward	pressure	 on	 their	credit	 ratings.	Does	 the	 regulator	 then	have	 to	allow	price	 increases	 to	protect	credit	 ratings?	 The	 boundaries	 of	 responsibility	 are	 blurred	 and	 complicated	further	 because	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 itself	 has	 a	 major	 impact	 on	 the	perceived	creditworthiness	of	the	water	companies.	The	ability	of	firms	to	repay	debts	 built	 on	 securitised	 water	 bills	 requires	 a	 highly	 predictable	 regulatory	framework.	 Credit	 ratings	 agency,	Moody’s,	 raised	 concerns	 in	 the	 build	 up	 to	PR14	that	cuts	in	allowed	returns	for	water	companies	would	be	‘credit	negative’	and	the	highly	geared	water	companies	(Anglian,	Thames,	Yorkshire	and	Southern	Water)	were	 the	most	 vulnerable.11	The	 regulator	 is	 not	 external	 to	 the	 credit	
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rating	process	and	there	are	suggestions	that	the	high	debts	of	some	companies	offer	 protection	 against	 tighter	 regulation.	 According	 to	 Bloomberg	Businessweek:	‘The	debt	mountain	at	UK	water	companies	is	their	best	defence	against	 politicians	 seeking	 to	 cut	 the	 cost	 of	 living’	 (Bloomberg	 News	 2013).	Research	by	OXERA,	cited	in	Turner	(2013:	48),	also	indicates	that	‘a	significant	number	of	investors	believed	that	if	companies	took	on	more	debt	the	regulator	would	be	less	likely	to	take	action	against	them	as	action	would	be	more	likely	to	lead	to	the	company	experiencing	financial	difficulty’.	There	is	a	sense	in	which	such	water	companies	have	become	too	indebted	to	be	properly	regulated!	The	interplay	of	these	complex	relations	then	has	a	bearing	on	the	outcomes	of	regulation	which	is	 far	 from	a	simple	mechanical	exercise	of	allowing	for	costs,	incentivising	 innovation	 and	 sharing	 its	 benefits.	 Indeed,	 the	 regulator	 is	effectively	caught	in	a	trap	of	allowing	for	financialised	rewards	to	its	companies	or	 have	 the	 industry	 face	 increased	 financial	 costs	 with	 corresponding	implications	for	subsequent	pricing	(with	rewards	going	to	lenders	instead).		The	mandate	of	 the	regulator	 to	protect	 the	 interests	of	consumers	and	ensure	financeability	 for	companies	 is,	however,	 conveniently	broad	and	unspecific.	 In	practice,	 the	 regulator	 intervenes	 selectively	 in	 some	 areas	 and	 steps	 back	completely	in	others.	One	example	of	such	selective	intervention	is	the	Revenue	Correction	 Mechanism	 (RCM).	 The	 RCM	 highlights	 some	 of	 the	 contradictions	emerging	from	attempting	to	force	the	provision	of	water	into	a	‘market’	structure.	Across	the	sector	there	is	a	policy	to	increase	the	proportion	of	consumers	that	access	 water	 with	 a	 meter.	 This	 is	 intended	 to	 reduce	 water	 consumption,	particularly	 in	parts	of	 the	country	 that	are	water	stressed	 (Ofwat	2013b).	But	where	company	revenue	is	earned	on	units	sold,	such	a	reduction	leads	to	a	fall	in	
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turnover	and	profits.	In	EW,	this	is	overcome	by	the	RCM.	Under	this	policy,	the	price	of	water	is	adjusted	in	a	price	review	period	to	account	for	over-	or	under-	consumption	in	the	previous	period.	If	consumption	falls,	the	price	is	increased	in	the	next	period.	This	is	designed	to	overcome	the	disincentive	that	firms	face	to	encourage	households	to	reduce	their	water	consumption.		This	is,	unsurprisingly,	not	made	obvious	to	consumers,	who	are	advised	on	how	to	keep	their	bills	down.	The	Consumer	Council	for	Water	provides	guidance	on	how	to	cut	water	bills	by	being	water	efficient.	Advice	includes	installing	a	‘save-a-flush’	device	in	the	toilet	cistern;	taking	a	shower	instead	of	a	bath;	avoid	over-filling	 the	 bath;	 and	 turning	 off	 the	 tap	when	 brushing	 teeth	 (CCW	2013).	 But	consumer	advice	should	come	with	the	caveat	that,	while	your	bill	may	fall	in	the	current	price	review	period,	it	will	be	increased	in	the	next	period	so	that	water	companies	are	not	out	of	pocket.		While	 this	seems	 to	be	a	clear	regulatory	 intervention	 to	protect	 investors,	 the	regulator	opts	elsewhere	not	to	intervene,	for	example,	in	the	capital	structures	of	highly-leveraged	firms.	The	very	high	debts	of	securitised	water	companies	are	potentially	vulnerable	to	shocks	and	a	threat	to	sustainability	as	there	is	no	space	to	 increase	 borrowing	 if	 necessary,	 quite	 apart	 from	 the	 interest	 costs	 to	 end	users.	Given	that	Ofwat	is	charged	with	protecting	the	interest	of	consumers,	it	is	difficult	to	see	any	way	in	which	this	rent	extraction	by	private	equity	firms	is	of	any	benefit	to	consumers.	But	Ofwat	does	not	want	 to	 intervene	 to	prevent	 these	 ‘market-led	 structures’	(Ofwat	2011b).	In	a	speech	by	the	Chairman	of	Ofwat,	Jonson	Cox,	it	was	stated:	‘The	 regulator	 has	 previously	 taken	 the	 view	 that	 the	 capital	 structure	 of	 the	companies	 (and	 consequent	 risks)	 is	 for	 the	 boards	 and	 shareholders	 to	
This	is	the	version	of	the	article	accepted	for	publication	in	New	Political	Economy	published	by	Taylor	&	Francis	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13563467.2017.1259300		
	 19	
determine’.	And	this	view	continues	as	long	as	the	water	utility	is	not	put	at	risk	(Ofwat	2013:	.9).	On	the	contrary,	rather	than	being	alarmed	by	the	rapid	increase	in	 gearing,	 this	 is	 seen	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 regulatory	 regime,	demonstrating	 a	 high	 level	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 sector:	 ‘Stakeholders	 have	acknowledged	this	stable	and	transparent	regulatory	framework	as	a	factor	that	has	allowed	the	companies	to	sustain	a	relatively	high	 level	of	gearing,	but	still	maintain	investment	grade	credit	ratings’	(Ofwat	2011b:	37).		Essentially,	the	regulator	is	permissive	when	it	comes	to	financialisation.	As	long	as	the	regulated	utility	meets	its	targets,	what	happens	to	financial	structures	is	considered	irrelevant.	However,	this	amounts	to	tacit	support	for	financialisation.	Ofwat’s	position	here	is	driven	in	part	by	a	cultural	attachment	to	incentive-based	regulation	 even	 though,	 as	 shown	 above,	 the	 incentive	 created	 has	 been	 to	increase	 profit	 via	 financial	 rather	 than	 productive	 innovation.	 But,	 secondly,	Ofwat	 is	 not,	 and	 does	 not	 see	 itself,	 in	 a	 position	 to	 regulate	 these	 financial	dealings.	It	is	challenging	enough	monitoring	the	activities	of	the	water	utilities.	Attempting	to	control	the	machinations	of	global	private	equity	is	beyond	its	scope	and	ambition.	As	Ofwat	states,	it	is	not	designed	to	assess	future	financial	failure	as	 if	 a	 credit	 rating	 agency	 itself	 (Ofwat	 2011b:	 38).	 Finally,	 the	 culture	 of	financialisation	 is	 greatly	 strengthened	 by	 the	 ‘revolving	 door’	 between	 the	industry	and	regulator.	The	Chairman	of	Ofwat,	Jonson	Cox,	was	awarded	a	pay-out	 of	 almost	 £10m	when	 he	 left	 Anglian	Water	 in	 2010	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	increase	in	shareholder	value	during	his	time	at	the	company	(see,	for	example,	Daily	Express	2010).	Cox	was	Chief	Executive	at	the	company	when	Anglian	was	taken	over	by	private	equity	investors	in	2006	when	a	special	dividend	of	£215m	was	paid	to	shareholders	and	gearing	increased	to	83	per	cent.12	Cox	is	therefore	
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unlikely	to	challenge	other	firms	operating	in	the	same	manner	unless	he	were	to	become	poacher	turned	gamekeeper.	
Financialised	consumption	and	consumers	
	The	 privatisation	 of	 water	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 shift	 in	 relations	 of	 social	reproduction.	For	Bakker	(2005:	548)	 ‘consumer	access	 is	 legitimated	not	by	a	citizen’s	entitlement	to	water	as	a	service	but	by	a	customer’s	purchase	of	water	as	a	quasicommodity.	A	reconfiguration	of	the	hydrosocial	contract	between	users	and	 their	 environment	 is	 required’.	 However,	most	 consumers	 have	 very	 little	involvement	 in	 the	 industry	 beyond	 paying	 their	 bill,	 and	water	 providers	 are	largely	 invisible.	 A	 study	 on	 consumer	 attitudes	 to	water,	 based	 on	 a	 series	 of	workshops	with	water	customers,	found	that	most	respondents	had	no	idea	who	owned	their	water	company	(and	many	thought	 the	owners	were	French).	The	corporate	structure	was	largely	unknown,	not	a	high	priority	for	respondents,	and	was	 not	 felt	 to	 impact	 on	 perceptions	 of	 value	 for	 money	 (Creative	 Research	2013).	Consumers	are	in	no	position	to	understand	the	financial	practices	taking	place	in	the	sector	or	their	role	in	paying	for	this.	The	information	is	difficult	to	find	and	is	obscured	by	a	greater	emphasis	on	superficial	forms	of	customer	engagement.	For	example,	 in	 extensive	 customer	 surveys	 conducted	 by	 the	 Regulator	 and	 the	consumer	body,	 the	Consumer	Council	 for	Water	(CCW),13	customers	are	asked	questions	such	as	how	satisfied	they	are	with	their	water.	This	generates	findings,	for	 example,	 that	75	per	 cent	 of	 customers	 are	 satisfied	with	 value	 for	money.	Where	customers	feel	that	the	water	price	they	pay	is	unfair,	this	is	mainly	because	it	is	perceived	as	‘expensive’	or	has	risen.	But	customers	are	lacking	information	on	which	to	base	their	views	as	they	cannot	know	the	costs	on	which	their	bill	is	
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based,	and	they	are	in	no	position	to	determine	if	the	price	they	pay	is	fair.	Such	opinions	are	more	likely	to	be	derived	from	media	campaigns	and	public	relations	efforts	of	companies,	or	simply	that	the	tap	works	at	relatively	low	cost	compared	to	other	necessities.		The	 issues	 of	 finance	 are	 out	 of	 reach	 for	 most	 consumers,	 instead	 being	Collectively	 organised	 by	 a	 tight	 (Closed)	 group	 of	 agents	 including	 the	water	companies,	 the	regulator	and	 financial	advisors.	While	CCW	has	achieved	some	success	 in	 navigating	 the	 complexities	 of	 finance	 on	 behalf	 of	 consumers,	 for	example	 in	providing	 input	 into	 consultations	 on	 the	weighted	 average	 cost	 of	capital	 in	PR14	(ECA	2014),	consumers	are	not	invited	to	engage	in	debates	on	capital	 structures	 or	 securitisation	 or	 directors’	 remuneration.	 Consumer	Challenge	Groups	(CCGs),	established	by	water	companies	to	approve	company	business	plans	 for	2015-20,	were	not	equipped	 to	engage	 in	any	discussion	on	corporate	 finances.	 The	 CCG	 for	 Southern	Water,	 when	 asked	 to	 comment	 on	whether	or	not	 the	shareholders	are	making	returns	which	are	 fair,	 responded	that	they	were	not	in	a	position	to	judge:	‘the	CCG	is	not	the	best	body	to	answer	this	question’	(SWCCG	2013:	24).	The	 result	 then	 has	 been	 a	 highly	 successful	 narrowing	 of	 Contestation	 to	 a	manageable	set	of	issues	for	companies.	Glossy	presentation	gives	the	appearance	of	 a	 customer	 focus	 with	 firms	 responding	 to	 customer	 needs.	 Water	 is	increasingly	Commodified	and	packaged	as	a	consumer	good.	For	example,	 in	a	survey	for	CCW,	households	are	asked	how	likely	they	would	be	to	recommend	their	water	provider	to	friends	and	family	in	order	to	calculate	what	is	termed	a	‘Net	Promoter	Score’	(NPS).	The	overall	NPS	for	water	is	23.	This	is	compared	with	results	for	Apple	(69),	First	Direct	(61),	Sky	(14),	Churchill	Insurance	Company	(-
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8),	and	 the	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	(RBS)	 (-19)	 (CCW	2015).	Thus,	water	 is	 re-invented	as	a	consumer	good	with	customers	a	little	less	happy	with	their	water	than	they	are	with	their	technology	provider	but	more	happy	than	they	are	with	the	 scandalised	 bank,	 RBS.	 This	 survey	 information	 is	 gathered,	 analysed	 and	presented	 even	 though	 there	 is	 no	 choice	 of	 water	 provider.	 But	 this	 kind	 of	consultation	has	contributed	to	the	cultural	Construal	of	water	as	a	Commodity	like	any	other	and	the	consumer	as	a	customer.		There	 are,	 however,	 some	 increasing	 concerns	 about	 affordability	 with	 the	proportion	 of	 households	 spending	 more	 than	 5	 per	 cent	 of	 their	 disposable	income	on	water	bills	 increasing	 from	8	per	cent	 in	2002/03	 to	12	per	cent	 in	2011/12	 (NAO	 2013),	 amounting	 to	 about	 2.7m	 households.	 Those	 that	 have	trouble	paying	for	water	are,	on	the	whole,	the	poorest	and	there	is	a	statistically	significant	relationship	between	debt	and	deprivation	(Ofwat	2011g:	27).	Analysis	by	 the	 debt	 charity	 StepChange	 found	 that	 water	 bill	 arrears	 were	 higher	 for	female	 clients,	 for	 households	 with	 children,	 and	 especially	 lone	 parents	(StepChange	 2014).	 For	 the	 water	 companies	 and	 the	 Regulator,	 however,	indebtedness	 is	 seen	 purely	 in	 business	 terms.	 Bad	 debts	 now	 add	 £15	 to	 the	average	bill.	There	 is	some	means-tested	support	 for	 those	 that	have	problems	paying.	 Water	 companies	 are	 now	 able	 to	 introduce	 ‘social	 policies’	 in	 water	pricing	 but	 this	 is	 subject	 to	 narrow	provisos,	 including	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 social	provision	must	not	be	more	than	the	revenue	saved	from	the	introduction	of	such	measures.		Although	it	is	known	that	those	that	fail	to	pay	their	bills	are	on	the	whole	the	most	deprived,	non-payment	is	depicted	to	some	degree	as	profligate,	as	for	example	in	the	title	of	the	Ofwat	web	page,	‘A	drain	on	society	–	what	can	be	done	about	water	
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debt?’14	The	angle	taken	by	Ofwat	is	that:	‘Consumer	debt	makes	it	more	difficult	and	expensive	for	companies	to	finance	investment	in	services.	It	also	means	that	customers	who	pay	their	bills	promptly	are	effectively	subsidising	those	who	do	not.	 This	 raises	 difficult	 issues	 about	 fairness,	 particularly	 for	 those	 on	 low	incomes	who	do	manage	to	pay	their	bills’.	Paying	for	water	has	become	tinged	with	moral	responsibility,	with	non-payment	of	bills	Construed	as	depriving	the	sector	 of	 investment	 and	 exploiting	 hard-working	 households	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	underpinning	bloated	returns	to	globally	organised	investment	funds.		Consumers	are	crucial	if	passive	agents	in	the	financialisation	of	water.	It	is	their	regular	payment	of	bills	on	which	the	whole	architecture	of	securitisation	rests.	They	are	now	financing	significant	payments	to	the	financial	sector	in	the	payment	of	their	water	bills.	The	average	water	bill	was	£396	in	2014/15	(Ofwat	2014).	Out	of	this,	interest	and	dividend	payments	are	around	£100	a	year	per	household.15	With	23	million	households	(ONS	2011)	in	EW	that	amounts	to	over	£2bn	each	year	transferred	from	households	to	pay	for	returns	on	debt	and	equity	for	water	companies	(excluding	non-household	consumers).	This	 is	what	feeds	the	global	circuits	 of	 capital	 referred	 to	 by	 Swyngedouw	 (2005)	 and	 where	 speculative	activity	 is	 anchored	 in	 real	 activity	 as	 outlined	 by	 Leyshon	 and	 Thrift	 (2007)	attaching	households	to	private	financiers	around	the	world.	Yet	consumers	have	no	 awareness	 of	 this.	 They	 are	 unwitting	 agents	 in	 the	 processes	 of	financialisation.	That	consumers	pay	higher	bills	that	provide	revenue	to	finance	securitisation	and	financialisation	is	not	unique	to	water.	However,	the	previous	discussion	shows	that	the	sector	is	dominated	by	a	culture	of	‘market	outcomes’	which	 is	 structurally	 skewed	against	 consumers	both	 in	 their	bills	proximately	funding	the	costs	of	financialisation	and	their	lack	of	access	to	knowledges	of	such	
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practices.	 The	 regulatory	 function	 is	 inherently	 compromised	 by	 the	 need	 to	remain	 investor-friendly	combined	with	 the	weight	and	complexity	of	 financial	activity	within	the	sector	which	takes	place	at	an	unobserved	distance	from	the	bills	that	appear	through	the	letter	box.		
Conclusion		Opposition	to	water	privatisation	has	sometimes	sparked	riots,	most	notably	in	Bolivia.	 Protests	 and	 poor	 delivery	 around	 the	world	 have	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	privatisation	 contracts	 being	 terminated	 and	 water	 being	 renationalised	(Kishimoto	et	al.	2014).	In	contrast,	the	lack	of	dissent	around	the	financialisation	of	water	in	EW	is	striking.	This	paper	has	attempted	to	provide	some	insights	into	the	cultures	and	structures	that	have	allowed	and	even	encouraged	this	feature	of	EW’s	water	financialisation.		The	Context	has	been	significant.	The	way	in	which	water	was	privatised,	and	the	culture	 of	 privatisation	 across	 many	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy,	 has	 facilitated	financialisation.	In	addition,	the	private	water	industry	is	long-established	in	EW.	Hence	 investors	 have	 been	 able	 to	 rely	 on	 regulatory	 stability	 to	 boost	securitisation	revenues.	The	complexities	of	the	sector	are	such	that	consumers	have	little	option	but	to	place	faith	in	the	Regulator	to	protect	their	interests.	In	some	respects,	 consumers	appear	 to	have	benefitted	 from	the	privatised	water	SoP	over	the	years,	receiving	a	good	quality,	regular	water	supply.	The	2014	price	review	will	bring	prices	down	by	around	5	per	cent	(before	inflation)	over	the	next	five	years.		However,	this	obscures	the	complexities	of	the	underlying	financial	activities,	as	discussed	 above.	 Contestation	 has	 been	 channelled	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 narrow,	superficial	consumer	consultations,	and	regulation	is	skewed	to	address	specific	
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issues	 such	 as	 capital	 costs,	 leakage	 and	 customer	 services	 at	 the	 expense	 of	others.	In	particular,	the	securitisation	of	household	bills	and	the	influence	of	the	financial	 sector	 remain	 unquestioned.	 But	 even	 if	Ofwat	wanted	 to	 control	 the	financial	 extraction	 of	 private	 equity	 firms	 it	 is	 questionable	 if	 this	 would	 be	possible,	 given	 the	 immense	 challenges	 that	 financial	 regulation	 raises	 in	 the	wider	economy.	The	 financialisation	 of	 water	 has	 also	 been	 noticeably	 absent	 from	 political	debates.	Some	campaigners	are	supporting	the	re-nationalisation	of	the	railways	and	energy	companies,	but	most	are	silent	when	it	comes	to	water.	This	could	be	due	to	the	success	of	the	water	companies	and	Ofwat	in	emphasising	the	positives	of	 privatisation	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 increases	 in	 investment	 and	 quality	 of	 water.	According	to	Ofwat,	water	companies	are	currently	investing	around	£80	million	a	week	 in	maintaining	and	 improving	assets,	and	services	and	consumers	have	access	 to	 drinking	 water	 of	 excellent	 quality. 16 	There	 are	 also	 political	 issues	involved.	Stakeholders	in	water	companies	have	interests	in	other	infrastructure	investments.	For	example,	the	Chinese	government	has	a	stake	in	Thames	Water	and	is	being	courted	for	further	infrastructure	investments	in	the	UK,	not	least	the	new	nuclear	power	stations	at	Hinkley	Point	and	beyond.		An	additional	factor	may	be	that	the	complexities	of	ownership	are	too	challenging	and	costly	to	unravel.	For	example,	in	March	2014	the	total	debts	of	the	Kemble	Water	Finance	Group,	which	owns	Thames	Water,	came	to	over	£10.5bn	(next	to	an	operating	income	for	Thames	Water	of	just	£23.6m	in	2014)	and	incorporates	numerous	bond	issues	made	by	different	group	companies,	some	located	in	the	Cayman	Islands	and	some	with	a	maturity	date	as	far	off	as	2062.17	In	the	current	economic	climate	there	is	unlikely	to	be	any	political	appetite	for	devoting	public	
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funds	to	water	re-nationalisation.	This	paper,	then,	shows	the	power	of	finance	in	shaping	 sector	 outcomes	 and	 that	 this	 is	maintained	 by	 instilling	 cultures	 that	normalise	 such	 practices.	 This	 hegemony	 is	 preserved	 with	 the	 consumer	distanced	from	the	financial	operations	of	the	sector	and	rent	extraction	treated	as	a	‘market	outcome’	which	can	be	interpreted	as	the	new	‘common	sense’,	in	the	spirit	of	Ekers	and	Loftus	(2008),	discussed	above.		To	return	to	the	theme	of	the	10Cs	raised	in	the	Introduction	to	this	volume,	and	at	 various	 points,	 above,	 the	 material	 culture	 of	 water	 finance	 is	 Constructed	around	 financialisation	 but	 Construed	 as	 if	 regulated	market	 outcomes	 suffice	with	no	grounds	for	these	to	be	Contested	despite	private	firms	pushing	for	ways	to	extract	surplus	in	the	form	interest	and	dividends.	But	decision-making	around	financing	decisions	 are	Closed	with	only	 token	 involvement	 of	 consumers,	 and	water	 heavily	 Commodified,	 presented	 as	 a	 good	 like	 any	 other,	 and	with	 the	Regulator	seeking	to	ensure	that	consumers	Conform	to	this	new	form	of	water	culture.	Payment	for	water	is	Construed	as	a	moral	obligation	with	non-payment	depicted	 as	 depriving	 the	 sector	 of	 investment	 finance	 and	 exploitative	 of	 the	obedient	 customers	 that	 pay	 their	 bills.	 Context	 is	 significant	 with	 no	 other	country	operating	their	water	in	this	way.	Finally,	water	pricing	is	presented	as	a	technical	exercise	but	there	are	underlying	Contradictory	pressures	that	emerge	from	water	conceived	both	as	an	essential	commodity	 for	all	households	and	a	source	 of	 profit	 for	 financial	 investors.	 The	 setting	 of	 tariffs	 is	 not	 neutral	 but	results	in	specific	distributional	outcomes.	
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		 Fig	1:	Thames	Water	Utilities	Limited	Group	Structure	and	flow	of	funds	
	Source:	Thames	Water	Utilities	Ltd	Annual	Report	(2015:	33)																						
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Table	1:	Credit	ratings	and	gearing	levels	for	WaSCs	
Credit	
rating18	
Outlook	 Company	 GEARING	 -
Net	
debt/RAV	A3	 Stable	 Dwr	Cymru	(Welsh	Water)	 61.7	A3	 Stable	 United	Utilities	Water	Plc	 62.7	A3	 Stable	 Severn	Trent	Water	Ltd	 66.7	A3	 Stable	 Wessex	Water	 68.1	Baa1	 Stable	 Northumbrian	Water	Ltd	 70.4	Baa1	 Stable	 Thames	Water	Utilities	Ltd	 79.0	Baa1	 Stable	 Anglian	Water	Services	 80.4	Baa1	 Stable	 Yorkshire	Water	Services	Ltd	 82.6	Baa2	 Negative	 Southern	Water	Services	Ltd	 81.3	Source:	Moody’s	2013	
		
18	Based	on	corporate	family	and	not	class	of	debt.																																																										
